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FOREWORD

NATO's enlargement has brought it to the borders of the
Baltic states who covet membership in NATO. However,
admitting them into NATO is one of the most difficult
problems for the Alliance because of Russia's unconditional
opposition to such action and because of NATO's own
internal divisions on this issue. Nonetheless, a new regime
or system of security for the entire Baltic region must now
be on the U.S. and European agenda.
The key players in such a process are Russia, Germany,
and the United States. Their actions will determine the
limits of the possible in constructing Baltic security for the
foreseeable future. In this study, Dr. Stephen Blank
presents a detailed and extensive analysis of these three
governments' views on Baltic and European security. Their
views on regional security are materially shaped by and
influence their larger views on their mutual relations and
policy towards Europe. Their views also demonstrate the
complexity of the issues involved in constructing Baltic, not
to mention European, security. But because NATO
enlargement is the most serious foreign policy and defense
issue before Congress now, such an analysis can illuminate
much of what is happening in the NATO enlargement
process and why it has taken its current shape. Therefore
the Strategic Studies Institute presents this monograph in
order to contribute to this emerging great debate over
NATO's enlargement.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

As NATO enlarges and approaches the borders of the
Baltic states, it faces one of the most difficult and complex
security challenges in contemporary Europe. While the
Baltic states crave membership in NATO, Russia deems
that outcome as unacceptable, threatens to break
cooperation with the West in such an event, and NATO
allies themselves remain divided over the wisdom of Baltic
membership. The apparent irreconcilability of NATO's and
Russia's positions, and the Baltic states' insistence upon
consideration for their security interests, oblige both East
and West to collaborate on devising a workable and
acceptable security system for the region that respects both
Russian and Baltic, not to mention Western, interests.
Otherwise, this region might become the flashpoint of a
political conflict that could eventually degenerate into a
military one.
NATO must simultaneously deter Russia and reassure
it and the Baltic states that their security will be enhanced.
The key players in this process are Russia, Germany, and
the United States. They have the means to shape the future
parameters of any Baltic security system and are the
principal players in Europe as well. And it is their policies
that will define the limits of what can be done in the Baltic,
as well as in much of Europe, since Baltic security is
inseparable from that of Europe as a whole. Or, in other
words, European security is indivisible, and Baltic security
is part of it.
However, analysis of Russian policy through 1997
suggests that Russia remains fundamentally incapable of
playing a constructive role in this process. Russian policies
for Europe are incoherent and attached to models of
European security that have little or no relevance to other
states or that actually alarm them. Russia still disdains the
small states, thinking them to be of no consequence,
proposes infeasible and objectionable schemes of panv

European collective security that do not bind it but would
bind NATO, and at the same time pursues unilateralist
spheres of influence policies in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Russian policy is also frankly and
openly revisionist, demanding border revisions and
refusing to sign formal border treaties to recognize the post1989 changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Its
spokesmen make demands for an exceptional position in
Europe or for unworkable security systems that do little to
advance faith in Russia's coherence or good will.
Furthermore, its policy statements reveal a continuing
addiction to old-fashioned doctrines of zero-sum games, of
viewing everything in terms of correlations of antagonistic
military forces, and of desires for exclusive rights over small
states.
These obstacles to Russian success in Europe are
prominent in Russia's Baltic policies. Russia continues to
make threats against the Baltic states of economic war, of
criminal subversion from without, and of refusing to
recognize borders, while attempting to gain a veto over
NATO's activities. Because Russia cannot carry out these
threats, it only further antagonizes the Baltic states, makes
them more intractable in their own anti-Russian policies at
home and abroad, and only worsens the regional situation.
Whereas 4-5 years ago Russia might have been able to
achieve a genuine neutralization of the region, today that is
impossible. Now many of NATO's members are involved in
trying to secure the region. Until such time as Russia can
devise coherent and responsible policies for Europe, it will
continue to lose ground there and be seen as a threat more
than as part of the solution.
However, it is precisely due to its military-political
capability to be a threat that Germany has attempted to
conduct a policy where, on the one hand, it wants to expand
(or so it says) the European Union (EU) and NATO to the
East but will otherwise do nothing that antagonizes
President Boris Yeltsin and Russia. As a result, Germany
has steadily backtracked since 1993 on Baltic admission
into NATO and proposed terms for Russia's integration into
vi

NATO's policy process–the new NATO-Russia Council–that
remarkably prefigured the final agreement on the Council
in May 1997. Unfortunately, those terms went far beyond
giving Russia “a voice but not a veto” and certainly made it
clear that Germany will not accept Baltic membership in
NATO anytime soon. Indeed, German Foreign Ministry
officials speaking in Moscow openly alluded to the need not
to do anything that wounds Russian sensitivities, explicitly
giving Russia a veto on future expansion. Thus, it is unlikely
that Germany will shoulder the responsibilities of helping
to underpin a security regime that is viable for the Baltic. If
anything, all the evidence suggests that Germany is trying
to force the Nordic states, mainly Finland and Sweden, and
the United States to bear this burden while it basically gets
a free ride.
Accordingly, it falls to Washington to take the lead here,
as it has done in the general process of enlargement.
Washington has done so. It has crafted new political and
institutional formulas for NATO within the Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program that will enhance the scope of Baltic
and other states' political and military participation in the
alliance's activities. It is devising programs like shared air
defense and the U.S.-Baltic charter to allay their security
concerns while seeking to integrate Moscow through the
Council.
Yet here, too, American policy seems to run into
difficulties. Evidently, as cited below, many U.S. officials
have come to view Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as
having outlived its usefulness and as merely a part of the
political superstructure needed for reassurance rather than
as an operative, vital part of the Alliance. Washington has
told Sweden, for example, that it looks towards a collective
security system in which all the states of Europe can
participate through the PfP program. The language of this
program's founding documents is very close to that of Article
4 of the Washington Treaty that calls only for consultations
in the event of a threat to security. Thus membership in the
PfP program only gives states the right of consultation in
the event of a threat to their security, it does not give them
vii

the security guarantee commonly held to derive from Article
5.
Even though the United States is the only state that is
really trying to lead the formation of a regional and
continental system, its approach attempts to advance
NATO's enlargement while maintaining that a clearly
increasingly anti-American and revisionist Russia is a
democratic partner for Washington. This lack of realism
betrays a substantial confusion in policy that is not
warranted by Russia's truculent posture or Germany's
interest in having others do for it what it will not do for
itself, namely play a more active role in areas like the Baltic.
While the innovations proposed by the United States to
NATO and the PfP program are sound and will enhance
Baltic security, it is not clear that they will go far enough to
overcome regional tensions, unless the EU and Europe are
also brought into the picture so that a true regional
stabilization can occur. Likewise, we need to recognize that,
however much Europe has changed since 1949, the pledge of
collective defense to treaty members under Article 5 is still
relevant, and that it is not at all clear if Russia truly has
reconciled itself to the status quo. As President Clinton
recently wrote to Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-Texas),
we still need to guard against the possibility of a regression
in Russian politics that would threaten the accomplishments of the last decade. Among those achievements is
the independence of the Baltic states.
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NATO ENLARGEMENT AND
THE BALTIC STATES:
WHAT CAN THE GREAT POWERS DO?

Introduction.
NATO's enlargement will transform European security.
But the Baltic states are not among NATO's first new
members because their defense organizations do not yet
meet NATO's standards, and they have problems with their
Russian minorities and with Russia. 1 Moreover, NATO
members' reluctance to admit the Baltic states will probably
continue, leaving the latter outside of any functioning
European security structure. 2 Admitting these states to
NATO and/or the European Union (EU) presents European
governments and security organizations with many
difficult challenges, among them deterring Russian threats.
H. Plater-Zyberg, a British military analyst, writes,
“Moscow will have no difficulty ensuring that the area is not
sufficiently stable to join any security structures in the
future.” 3 If he is right, at least some of the Baltic states'
entry into NATO, and maybe the EU, might be postponed
indefinitely. Many pundits and diplomats also contend that
these states are indefensible against Russian threats, an
argument the Baltic states vehemently deny. 4 Thus, these
states' future status has become a major question in
European security.
Russia unconditionally opposes their entry into NATO,
calling it unacceptable. 5 Russia's 1993 military doctrine also
explicitly states that an alliance's expansion to states on its
borders, e.g., the Baltic states, threatens vital Russian
interests. Logically this means that Russia still seeks a veto
over NATO and Central and Eastern European security
policies even if it cannot obtain that goal. 6 In the wake of the
recent NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997, Foreign
Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that the issue of the Baltic
states and NATO was a condition for future East-West
cooperation. 7 Thus NATO enlargement to the Baltic states
1

could trigger a strong Russian reaction there, even if it is
only rhetorical, economic, and political at first. But a
military riposte could follow later and feature still more
political, and maybe military, pressure against the Baltic
states and NATO. 8 Moscow will, in either case, probably aim
to preserve and/or perpetuate the current regional
insecurity and prevent NATO's enlargement to the Baltic.
This regional security dilemma confirms that the main
problem with NATO's enlargement is that it complicates
the task of building security in and around Russia. 9
Nonetheless, NATO is committed to enlargement and must
accept its obligations. While those obligations do not mean
automatic defense of the Baltic states if they are attacked
(as would be the case for members), it does mean that NATO
cannot abstain from a substantive participation in the
establishment of a regional security system for the Baltic
region. NATO cannot simply wash it hands of those areas in
Europe that are only included in the Partnership for Peace
and ignore regional security issues either in the Balkans or
in the Baltic.
Therefore among those obligations that NATO has
incurred due to its enlargement is the challenge of building
a durable framework for regional security. Otherwise,
NATO's enlargement could aggravate, not reduce, Baltic
tensions. NATO and/or all the littoral states, including
Russia, might then adopt more confrontational postures.
The Baltic states, being outside any European security
system and there being no Western consensus over
upholding their security and independence, might face
strong Russian pressure to rejoin its sphere of influence.
Such pressures could trigger a European, not merely Baltic,
crisis. Therefore, to prevent such possibilities, we must
consider how to enhance Baltic security.
Paradoxically, excluding the Baltic states from Europe's
security structures magnifies the Baltic littoral's
importance for Europe. Because Russia has made the Baltic
states' exclusion from NATO a condition of future
cooperation with the West, it is now more urgent for Europe
and the United States to find at least an interim solution for
2

regional security dilemmas. In particular, the key great
powers–Russia, Germany, and the United States–who most
directly shape the region's security framework must take
the lead to assure mutual cooperation. Russia's importance
is clear from the map. American preponderance is equally
obvious. And both the Baltic states and neutrals like
Finland and Sweden accept that German policy greatly
influences regional trends and is essential to any regional or
European balance. 10
As in the past, European security organizations must
deter and reassure Russia while enhancing the security of
the littoral states. 11 These organizations must also jointly
share in any Baltic security plan so that no state or
organization obtains a free ride. Free riding occurs when
one or more states, or organizations, knowing or believing
that some other state or organization can or will formulate
solutions for major issues like Baltic security, effectively
abstains from serious participation in the solution. Instead
that state/s or organization/s then lets other states act
alone, gaining a free ride at their expense. If free riding
pervades an entire alliance as in the 1930s, security
guarantees are devalued and could even become worthless.12
Accordingly, to stabilize the Baltic region, states cannot
keep looking, as they are now tempted to do, for others to
ensure regional security. Free riding undermines Baltic
integration in Europe by dissolving the cohesion of the new
NATO-led security system. It also fosters renationalized
and unilateral security policies. Germany could incline
further to make a bilateral deal with Russia over Central
and Eastern Europe. As it is, Baltic cohesion, too, is already
eroding. Lithuania poses, not as a Baltic state, but as a
Central European one that seeks unilateral entry to
European organizations, while forsaking Latvia and
Estonia. Estonia follows suit regarding its future entry into
the EU and supports admitting at least one Baltic state into
NATO so that others might later gain a hearing. 13
Free riding and allied divisions regarding the Baltic
could create new and unforeseen regional problems and
3

clearly are due to the EU's and NATO's hesitations over
Baltic issues. 14 Regional cooperation, which is already
weakened due to NATO and the EU's reluctance to expand,
will further decrease where free riding and renationalized
agendas prevail. 15 Russia could then be tempted to extend
an unwelcome protectorate over the Baltic states.
To prevent such outcomes and protect the Baltic states,
NATO must continue to provide security, deter Russia,
reassure, and lead the non-NATO littoral states and
Europe's other security organizations, the EU and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), toward regional as well as European militarypolitical integration. Failure to do so will have grave
consequences. Ex-Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote
that Russia's Baltic policy is a litmus test of its European
and security policies. 16 Volker Ruhe, Germany's Minister of
Defense, wrote that the Baltic states are the practical
testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping
NATO's missions, territorial scope, the relations between
the United States and its European allies, the hoped for
partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building the
Europe we want to see. 17 German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel also stressed these states' importance for future
European security. 18
Thus failure to attend to Baltic issues could jeopardize
NATO enlargement and European security. Karl Kaiser, of
the German Society for Foreign Affairs, worried that the
U.S. Senate may make meaningful security for states not
admitted in the first round, like the Baltic states, a
precondition for ratifying enlargement. Dutch analysts
Alfred Van Staden and Gert de Nooy call the Baltic Europe's
most contested area where failure to reconcile Baltic,
Western, and Russian interests could reignite East-West
confrontation. 19 The 1991 Soviet coups in the Baltic and
Moscow led Central and East Europe to press for NATO
membership, so renewed pressure in the Baltic could have
equally grave consequences for the region, Europe, and
Russia.20 Not surprisingly, much European diplomacy now
revolves around the issues raised by NATO enlargement
4

and Baltic exclusion from it. On the one hand this
diplomatic activity acknowledges the indivisibility of
European security, but, on the other, it also reveals the
reluctance to accept the full implications of that fact. 21
Conditions for Baltic Security.
Although the Baltic region is one of Russia's vital
interests, these states must not be abandoned to Russia's
sphere of influence. Contrary to Russian policy, vital
interests and spheres of influence are not synonymous. An
equitable and lasting solution must involve and unite
Russia, the other littoral states, the EU, and NATO in a
common process. Disunity among these actors would erode
a Baltic system, precluding effective actions towards
regional security. Russia and the Baltic states must also
shun provocative actions. If they both eschew such actions,
any state opting out of the system will then incur the costs of
seeking to destabilize European security.
Even though Russia could have had Baltic neutrality or
“Finlandization” earlier, it is now impossible. 22 Today the
Baltic states and Russia must not become a source of trouble
or conflict to each other. The Baltic states should not choose
or be forced to become hostile front-line states against either
Russia or NATO. 23 That could lead to large, permanent,
peace-time deployments in or around those states and
either NATO's and/or Russia's military buildup. 24 We must
balance NATO recognition of Russia's legitimate interests
with an equal resolve to preserve and strengthen Baltic
security. Any threat to the Baltic states or acceptance of
their diminished security also endangers the other littoral
states and thus Europe. Therefore NATO and Russia have
substantial responsibilities. Failure to fulfill them will
cause perpetual regional tension, not stability.
Russia.
However, the expectation that Russia will act as a
responsible actor in a regional security regime is the most
unlikely outcome and problematical factor in the Baltic and
5

European equation. As Monika Wohlfeld of the West
European Union's (WEU) Institute for Security Studies
writes,
So far, Russia has not been able to make a clear impact on the
evolving European security structure. . . . Deprived of the
bipolar relationship with the United States, Moscow appears
unable–if not downright unwilling–to participate on an equal
footing with other Europeans in the establishment of a new
network of security institutions, and Russia's participation in
the Contact Group and then IFOR is considered by Moscow to be
a meager substitute for a more effective instrument with which
to wield its influence over European events.25

Much of this failure stems from Russian elites' inability
or refusal to accept European realities. They still insist that
Russia is a super or great power that must have global
equality with the United States and an exceptional place at
the “presidium table” of European security. 26 Russia seeks
status in Europe, not responsibility, and refuses to
participate except on its own terms. 27 Having signed the
Founding Act, Russia still is trying to use its new position to
block Poland's and other states' entry into NATO and push
for the OSCE to become the coordinator of NATO. Such
actions reflect Russia's continuing opposition to anything
that smacks of NATO's leadership in Europe. 28 As Sergei
Rogov, head of the USA-Canada Institute and a highly
regarded advisor to the government, recently wrote,
The Russian Federation is unwilling to consent to bear the
geopolitical burden of the defeat of the Soviet Union in the cold
war or to be reconciled with an unequal position in the new
European order.29

Thus Moscow has already served notice of its intention to
act as a Trojan horse inside NATO. This revisionist and
unrealistic stance diminishes Russia's neighbors' security
and aims to preserve that insecurity as a lasting condition of
Russian power. Russia still acts as if none of its neighbors
can be secure for it to be secure. 30 Russia continues to
pursue objectives and policies in Europe that its power does
not merit, that are unsustainable, and which ultimately
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endanger its own security. These policies are reintegrating
the CIS, creating an exclusive Russian sphere there,
demanding a veto over NATO's and Central and Eastern
Europe's activity, and barring Central and Eastern
Europe's military modernization. 31 Russia seeks equality
with the United States, its own unchallenged sphere in the
CIS, and the demilitarization of Central and Eastern
Europe so that the great powers alone could once again
revise their status.
Russia has reverted to old thinking about world politics
and Europe, such as correlations of forces, especially
military forces, zero-sum games, and worst case threat
scenarios. Not surprisingly, Russian elites believe that for
“Russia to be Russia” it must have exclusive and
uncontested dominance over the CIS and an accompanying
sphere of influence over the Baltic states. Any Western
influence in the CIS and Baltic immediately threatens
Russian vital interests even as Russia demands a veto and
voice in Western activities. Yeltsin's former senior foreign
policy advisor, Dmitri Ryurikov, observed that it was
“strange, unjust (or unfair) and wrong” for NATO not to
grant Russia such a veto and that “refusal to give Russia
this right actually deprives it of the possibility of taking part
in settling European security problems.” 32 In other words,
without an empire and that veto, Russia is nothing in
Europe, and everyone threatens it. But while the West must
not intervene in its sphere of influence, Russia must have
security rights or privileges unequal to every other state,
i.e., a veto over NATO and its policies. 33
To be sure, Russia has well-founded fears of exclusion
from the Baltic during wartime or a crisis. In many wars,
closure of the Baltic inflicted grievous military-economic
damage on Russia. Today, when Russians view long-range
naval and air based strike systems as the main military
threat and Russia's Baltic position is the worst peacetime
position since Peter the Great, these are not idle fears. Since
NATO's sea and air launched cruise missile routes directly
traverse the Baltic states, the importance to Moscow of air,
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missile, naval defense, early warning systems, and Baltic
counter-amphibious operations becomes clear.
Nonetheless, Russia's Baltic policies aggravate regional
and European tensions. NATO is significantly
demilitarizing and poses no threat to Russia. Moscow, at a
minimum, wants the Baltic states, which it considers
Saisonstaaten (states for a season), to be perennially on
NATO's doorstep but barred from NATO. 34 Yet this outcome
would not moderate Russian opposition to NATO or its
enlargement. Russian objectives are much greater as the
struggle over NATO's military policy underscores.
Russia prefers to demilitarize Central Europe, preserve
it as a buffer outside any viable European security system
pending the revival of Russian power and hegemony, and
neutralize NATO as an effective security provider. Russian
officials insist that NATO must confine itself to regional
peace operations under either U.N. and/or OSCE auspices,
giving Russia a veto over its activities.
And the new Founding Act with NATO unfortunately
goes a long way toward realizing those objectives and
restricting the West's ability to influence developments in
the CIS. While no state or party has a veto over the other
side's internal operations in the NATO-Russia Council, in
matters brought to the Council, in the absence of consensus,
no action can be taken. Therefore out of area operations in
the CIS are ruled out a priori. Spheres of influence peace
operations remain the order of the day. As Russian
commentators note, the preceding negotiations confirmed
that Europe will not let Russia be estranged even if
Washington wanted to do so. They are certainly right about
Germany and probably now about France as well. Nor is
Washington liable to do so since Russia is the key country to
Europe and the CIS and its democratic partner. No crisis or
question that arises where Russia has an interest will
escape discussion in the Council, nor is the West likely to
press towards a unilateral conclusion, and a Western
consensus will be hard to obtain. Therefore they argue that
Russia has obtained a de facto veto in the Council and more
flexibility in the CIS.35 Thus Russia's CIS, Baltic, and
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European policies are openly and unabashedly coercive and
dangerous.
Russia's policies for Europe and the “near abroad” rule out its
participation in a truly cooperative, Baltic, and European
security regime. Russia's main foreign and defense policy goal,
reintegrating the CIS under Russian auspices, necessarily
entails a high degree of strategic overextension, internal
instability in Russia, and perennial tension throughout the
“post-Soviet space” including the Baltic states.36

Moreover, these policies are inherently revisionist with
regard to Europe and the CIS.
The very concept of Russia as propounded by Boris Yeltsin and
his circle since 1990 has always been deeply problematic
because of the de jure equation which exists between the
Russian state and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (RSFSR). There has never been a Russian state in
history within the borders of the RSFSR, and those borders
are, with reason, seen as artificial not only by proponents of
the greater Russia, but, as the Chechen war shows, by the
proponents of a smaller one. The obvious but overlooked point,
therefore, is that in the former Soviet space Russia is not a
status quo power but a revisionist one. The argument in
Russia is how to revise the post-1991 status quo, not whether
to revise it.37

Indeed, one reason for Russia's pro-Western policies in
1991-93 was to win Western support for hegemony over the
CIS.38 NATO's enlargement starts a process that forecloses
that imperial option in the CIS. Therefore Russian
revisionism is not mere rhetoric, as some Western analysts
maintain, but aims squarely at the European status quo.39
In September 1996, Primakov told the OSCE that,
Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of
the two blocs no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are
not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold War, certain
countries in Europe–the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia–have disintegrated. A number of new states were
formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor
guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. Under the
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circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new
system of security.40

As Russia also demands guarantees of its integrity against
secessionist threats while the Ministry of Defense insists on
retaining the old Soviet borders, Primakov confirmed what
Alexei Arbatov called the duplicity of Russian border
policy. 41 Clearly, demanding revisions of neighboring
states' borders threatens them and the status quo.
Primakov also revealed Moscow's arrogant and foolish
belief that small states, like the Baltic states, have nothing
to add to Europe's security dialogue nor do they merit
security equal to Russia's. 42
Moscow's preferred system for its neighborhood dates
back to 1994, if not earlier. 43 Foreign Ministry officials and
prominent analysts outlined a concept calling for a Russianled CIS to be an equal pillar with NATO in European
security under the OSCE's supervision. Russia's veto in the
OSCE would safeguard its sphere of influence and restrain
NATO's freedom of action. Chernomyrdin reiterated this
call for an ostensibly collective security system in Europe at
the OSCE's December 1996 Lisbon conference. 44 Moscow
has also proposed a bilateral joint guarantee of Central
Europe with the United States and/or NATO, or a five power
conference with the United States, Great Britain, France,
and Germany to form a great power European security
directorate and exclude the small states which Russia
considers of little consequence and has basically shunned
since 1989. 45 Lately Yeltsin offered the Baltic states
guarantees, only to then warn Latvian President Gintis
Ulmanis that, unless Riga treats its Russians as Moscow
wants, relations will worsen. In other words, Moscow wants
its own private droit de regard over Baltic citizenship
policies on top of the powers vested in the OSCE and the
Council of Europe. Meanwhile, Russia still violently
opposes the Baltic states' entry into NATO and demands
rectification of their nationality policies. 46 Russian
guarantees have little value or chance of being accepted
under such conditions.
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Since unilateral or joint guarantees are not a fruitful
road for Russia, Moscow's most likely option is the new
NATO-Russia Founding Act. Here Russia seeks a veto
power over NATO's actions, a voice in NATO, and the power
to set conditions for NATO's enlargement, conventional and
nuclear deployments, or other subsequent military
operations through participation in NATO. Once inside
NATO, Moscow could obstruct any future enlargement,
even of those states chosen in Madrid. 47 NATO would then
ideally become a mere European peacekeeping organization
operating under the OSCE's purview. 48 Russia would
remain Europe's largest military power, the only one that
can act unilaterally and still have its sphere of influence.
And through the parallel negotiations on a new
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), it hopes to
formalize Central Europe's demilitarization since a purely
Russian imperial program cannot enhance regional,
European, or Russia's security but a major international
treaty can do so.
Russia's Baltic policy comports with Moscow's larger
program. Nor is this policy, or the perceptions upon which it
rests, confined to the lunatic fringe that views the Baltic
states only as giant criminal enterprises and intelligence
“launch pads” aimed at Russia. 49 On February 11, 1997, the
government, at Yeltsin's instructions, issued a new
statement of its Baltic policies. This statement supposedly
aimed to promote mutual friendship and a model of
relations based on economic integration and bilateral
cooperation (not regional cooperation which Russia
opposes), indivisibility and security of the countries, and
respect for human and ethnic minorities' rights. 50 However,
Russia has strange ideas about achieving these goals. First
of all, Baltic states' membership in NATO would have a
lasting and serious negative effect on relationships with
Russia.
Conversely, the preservation of their non-bloc status (and this
does not necessarily mean neutrality–author) would be able to
create a basis for bilateral and unilateral steps, and quite
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concrete ones, capable of dispelling the apprehension for
security which is still lingering in the Baltic states.51

Second, protecting Russian minorities' rights in the
Baltic remains a long-term policy goal. Russia spelled out
the conditions for citizenship that it insists Estonia's and
Latvia's Russian minorities must receive, seeking to dictate
those countries' fundamental citizenship legislation.
Furthermore, progress on treaties delimiting the RussoBaltic borders will not occur unless those states follow
Russia's recommendations on the broader issues of RussoBaltic relationships. As NATO and the EU have told
candidates that they must resolve border issues, Russia is
attempting to blackmail those states with permanent
exclusion from NATO and possibly the EU (Russia has
claimed to support Baltic entry into the EU–an example of
the contradictions in its Baltic and European policies, given
this statement) unless they surrender vital aspects of their
sovereignty regarding legislation and foreign policy. 52
Third, Moscow complains that economic ties are
undeveloped because the Baltic states use Russian goods
against Russian interests. It also argues that state and
customs controls must be strengthened. Yeltsin specifically
issued here a call to create favorable transport conditions to
Kaliningrad, i.e., opening a corridor through Lithuania.
Moscow has already demanded one through Poland and
been rebuffed. This new demand aims to ensure a military
route to Kaliningrad that would separate Poland as a NATO
member from the Baltic states. 53
Moscow also demands increased cultural cooperation to
overcome Baltic fears of its “cultural imperialism.” But this
agreement can create a basis for future cultural-political
agitation within those states where Russia could then
intervene from outside in their politics. 54 Finally, Moscow
demands an end to Baltic-based criminal threats against
Russia. Since Russian criminals have confessed to
fomenting ethnic animosities inside the Baltic states, and
Baltic governments believe Moscow directs such operations,
they wholly reject this arrogant and hypocritical demand. 55
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After the Helsinki Summit with President Clinton in
March 1997, Yeltsin and Primakov talked about a new
approach to the Baltic and giving them guarantees. But
later statements by Primakov to the EU's commissioners
and the demand for guarantees concerning minorities as a
precondition to border treaties signal Moscow's evident
intention to use the issue of Russian minorities abroad to
exclude the Baltic states from any European security
organization, not to ameliorate their condition, something
which Russia has not tried to do since 1992. These gambits
represent a probable futile effort at coercive diplomacy, i.e.,
forcing the Baltic states to turn to Moscow for security
guarantees, thus fulfilling Russia's policy objectives. 56
Trying to intimidate the Baltic states is long-standing.
In December 1996, Valery Loshchinin, Director of the
Second European Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, said that Russian diplomacy's strategic task in the
Baltic is to overcome the negative heritage of the past
(which included efforts to use the Russian troops there to
force changes in policy towards Russians 57 or to keep the
Baltic states out of the Council of Europe) and form
medium-term good neighbor relations with the Baltic
states. While Lithuania and Russia have good relations,
relations with Latvia and Estonia are complicated because
of their “massive gross infringement on human rights” of
the Russian-speaking population. 58 Russia, he said,
proceeds from Yeltsin's instructions to use trade and
economic policy to undo these alleged violations (few of
which are perceived by outside observers or even in the
Foreign Ministry's own journal, International Affairs).59
Russia has arrogated to itself the right to intervene in these
states' domestic policies. 60 Russian policy's economic aim is
“to eliminate or reduce to the minimum parasitic mediation
of the Baltic states in Russia's foreign trade.” Since 40
percent of Estonia and Latvia's budget revenues are
allegedly ensured at the expense of the transit of Russian
goods, Loshchinin urged an enhanced economic position for
Russia in the Baltic states' energy, banking, shipping,
industries, and trade. 61
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From a government notorious for its own corruption,
these are brazen accusations, as is the ever recurring threat
of sanctions, but they fit with Russia's coercive CIS and
European policies and precisely forecast the February 1997
statement. Indeed, Russian leaders regularly charge the
Baltic and CIS states with mistreating local Russians and
demand that the Baltic states, Ukraine, Kazakstan, etc.,
revise their domestic legislation, surrender territory to
Russia, or grant Russians dual citizenship rights and
preferences like those of extra-territoriality, the 19th
century's most visible sign of colonial rule. 62
Yet these policies are utterly irresponsible. As Russia is
economically and militarily prostrate, such confrontational
and hegemonic policies will inevitably trigger imperialism,
ethnopolitical conflict, and even possibly protracted war,
where Russia risks collapse. Already by 1992, Russian
generals reportedly realized their Baltic position was
untenable, and the army's current condition rules out
invasion for a long time. 63 Yet while NATO has no intention
of invading or threatening Russia and its members are
cutting their defense spending, Russia's army openly
rehearses and discusses invasion scenarios directed at the
Baltic states, against quite incredible threat assessments.
Or Russian spokesmen threaten to attack or target them
with nuclear and conventional weapons. 64 Though this kind
of posturing seems illogical, this has been the pattern for
some time and reflects the irresponsibility of many of
Russia's past policies in Europe.
This neo-imperial and coercive policy is rooted in
Russian domestic politics. Yeltsin's 1995 decree calling
reintegration of the CIS as a single unified politicaleconomic-military space a major state task for all
ministries, explicitly stated that one reason for this policy is
to counter growing separatist trends within Russia itself. 65
Primakov frequently reiterates this point and its
accompanying rationale, stating that, despite Russia's
economic and military weakness, it must now pursue a
great power policy based on its potential. Foreign policy
must create the most favorable conditions for accomplishing
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critical internal policies such as safeguarding Russia's
integrity and access to international organizations and
markets. That great power policy is also the best policy for
solving Russia's current and future problems, and for
regaining its deserved status as one pole of the multipolar
world against U.S. unipolar hegemony. 66
Consequently foreign policy should divert people from
the difficult domestic situation by pursuing an imperial
solution based on Russia's potential, not a sober evaluation
of reality. This program entails Russia's strategic
overextension as it poses as Eurasia's gendarme with a free
hand to quell unrest in its sanctioned sphere of influence.
Russian forces must then be perpetually stationed
throughout Russia's periphery in a vain effort to police it
and impose Russia's authority there. 67
This policy's ultimate logic means war. And, despite
Russia's present weakness, it represents a prima facie
reason for Russia's neighbors to apply to NATO. If this is
Russia's program when prostrate, what will Moscow do if it
recovers without countervailing forces to impede this grand
design? Critics of NATO enlargement who ask where is the
threat overlook this dimension of the issue. They fail to
realize what NATO Secretary General Javier Solana aptly
stated, that potential new members seek membership for
the same reason as did the old members. 68 Namely, they
sought political guarantees and European integration that
included Germany. 69
Yet while they threaten the Baltic states, Russian
leaders loudly protest the “growing threat” from NATO's
enlargement. Admiral Feliks Gromov, Commander in Chief
of the Navy, wrote that the increased defense cooperation
among Baltic, NATO, and Nordic states and pressures to
demilitarize the Kaliningrad Military District would leave
that district defenseless, threaten Russia's maritime
interests in the Baltic Sea, and render it vulnerable to
blockade. NATO's enlargement threatens Kaliningrad
province which is cut off from Russia proper, vital Russian
maritime interests, and European stability. 70 Thus Gromov
wrote:
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It is naive to say that the approach of the [NATO] bloc's armed
forces toward the Russian border will increase anybody's
security. Quite the contrary, such an action will undermine any
attempts to strengthen stability on the European continent.
The ultimate aim of such consolidation of the above mentioned
countries is clearly the limitation of Russia's influence in the
region, the securing of unilateral political, economic, and
military advantages and, as a result, crowding Russia out from
the community of Baltic states, limiting to the maximum its
access to the Baltic Sea, and possibly also revising the Helsinki
accords on the inviolability of the European borders.71

Indeed, in Russian military writing on the Baltic one
finds a visible current of despair. Admiral Yegorov, CINC of
the Baltic Fleet, observes that this fleet historically has
been Russia's main factor of stability in the Western
maritime direction. Today, Russia's vital interests in the
Baltic Sea are growing, but the economic-political-military
situation is deteriorating. The Baltic Fleet must play a
political and deterrent role, but it is undergoing the same
crisis as the rest of the Navy and cannot perform its function
unless other, ground forces are placed under its direction. 72
Western analyses agree on this area's rising strategic
profile. Sweden's Supreme Commander, General Owe
Wiktorin, stated:
More than 60 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear capacity,
compared to 25 percent a couple of years ago, will now be
deployed in the north. The strategic importance of the Kola
Peninsula brings, in its turn, a concentration of ground, sea, and
air units to the area. Hence Scandinavia and Sweden will
remain in the strategic limelight for a long time to come. In this
context, it is also appropriate to recognize that Sweden still
constitutes a major [littoral state on] the Baltic Sea. The Baltic
forms now, as it has for many centuries, an economic
intersection-zone. Sweden and Germany are the dominating
powers around the Baltic, neighboring Poland, the three fragile
Baltic states, Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast. The Baltic is
Russia's gateway to the West and has, as such, increased in
strategic importance.73

Russian deployments confirm this assessment. The Kola
naval complex will become the northern and sole naval
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nuclear bastion of the Russian fleet. Large modernized air
and naval forces will be deployed there to lend this fleet
combat stability. Russia‘s total forces in the Baltic equal
those of 1989 despite the end of the Cold War and the
massive decline of Soviet armed forces. The decision to
maintain these deployments despite those events
underscores the area's increased strategic significance for
Moscow as it is now a front-line area. Many forces in
Kaliningrad are forward-deployed; and the CFE treaty's
provisions for deployment in the front-line Leningrad
Military District were eased to allow more Russian forces
there.74 Everyone accepts the Baltic's rising strategic
centrality.
Still, Russia's way of expressing its concerns misreads
European realities. Russia's leadership uniformly views
NATO as strictly an anti-Russian military alliance, ignores
NATO's substantial demilitarization, still sees European
security in terms of rival blocs pursuing zero-sum and
antagonistic goals, willfully distorts NATO's position on
nuclear missiles, and greatly overrates Russia's power and
position in Europe. Russian elites also have recourse to a
diverse inventory of threats against the Baltic states and
Europe.75 Russian elites often rattle their nuclear sabers,
threatening to retarget the Baltic and European states if
NATO expands. 76
However, Russia's endless harangues of the Baltic states
for mistreating local Russians, constant threats of invasion,
demands for revised borders, economic pressure, boycotts
and sanctions, plus depictions of the Baltic states as
essentially criminal enterprises, do not advance Moscow's
or local Russians' interests. 77 These actions only increase
distrust of local Russians, especially as local Russian groups
are probably funded from Moscow. These threats fan Baltic
nationalism, intensify regional tensions and Baltic states'
fear of Russia, increase their governments' pressure to join
NATO, and alarm the West concerning Russian aims. Yet
since these tactics constantly fail, they encourage a Baltic
belief that Moscow is bluffing or cannot carry out its
threats.78 Nor do they lead the Baltic states to abandon their
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(perhaps misplaced) belief that ultimately the West will
rescue them. Russia's futile policies only heighten regional
tension, hindering the quest for regional solutions.
Thus these policies diminish Russia's security, and
would make sense only if Moscow had determined that its
interests required a high degree of “controlled tension” in
the Baltic region. But such tension is wholly counterproductive to a Russia which needs peace above all. Russia's
addiction to old thinking leads Moscow to make threats and
demands that cannot be carried out unless it risks its own
stability along with that of the Baltic states and Europe.
Since Moscow cannot or will not distinguish among the
threats it faces to create a national security program based
on a hierarchy of real threats, its spokesmen invoke
multiple, omnidirectional threats.
In fact, one of the most striking tendencies of current
Russian security policy is the divorce between political and
military realities. Vladimir Ivanov, of the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations and the USA-Canada
Institute, wrote that the 1993 defense doctrine showed that
“foreign policy cannot unquestionably be considered a factor
that sets the context and requirements for the military
policy of Russia.” Military policy and a doctrine of national
interests based on it have moved to the forefront of Russian
policy.79 Interests, goals, and real capabilities are disconnected in Russian policy. Moscow pursues unachievable
goals while possessing a quasi-Soviet mindset of empire,
universal threats to Russia, and cold war bipolarity. This
mindset is a recipe for disaster.
Russia's incapacity or even conscious refusal to
recognize NATO's changes since 1990 and current politicalmilitary character perpetuates obsolete bloc-like
approaches to European security. Conversations with
Russian analysts often suggest that they would prefer a
strict division of responsibilities or spheres of influence in
Europe with the Baltic on their side. They also harbor the
notion that Russia alone, or as leader of the CIS, must have
security equal to NATO's but greater than every Central
European state's security. That is, Russia wants unequal
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security for itself at everyone else's expense. 80 These
discussions also reveal an unwillingness or refusal to come
to grips with European or international reality, a failing
that has marred Russian policy and is so perceived abroad. 81
Accordingly, Russia will keep pressuring the Baltic
states to reestablish or invoke its hegemony. Certainly
Moscow construed the refusal to take these states into
NATO as a Russian victory and a base from which to
proceed towards a redivided Europe. 82 Yet Moscow also
knows that it cannot conduct military adventurism in the
Baltic states that would provoke a protracted local, if not
general European, war. Moscow's foreseeable pressures on
the Baltic states are largely rhetorical, diplomatic, political,
and economic to probe the limits of the possible and expand
Russia's sphere of action. But if Russia recovers and NATO
and European integration stagnates, we can expect more
pressure on the region. Western concessions will trigger
new demands, not reconciliation. Conversely, NATO's
resolution will more likely force Russia to accept the status
quo and the new reality.
That conclusion will also positively benefit Russia's
democratization because one factor that drives Russian
pressure is the ascendancy of the nationalist and
Realpolitik lobbies that will always raise the Baltic issue,
even when there are no grounds for doing so, to play to neoimperial lobbies and sentiment, and stifle reform. Both exForeign Minister Kozyrev and Zbigniew Brzezinski see that
the opposition to NATO represents the Nomenklatura's last
ditch stand for domestic power by playing the xenophobic
and imperial cards. 83 This is happening now where the
government, led by Yeltsin and Primakov, repeatedly beats
the drum of Baltic oppression of Russians and possible
threats to Russia if NATO expands there. 84 Many elites also
raise possible military threats to the Baltic in this context.
Due to this failure to grasp reality, Moscow continues to
pursue a unilateral hegemony in an area that cries for
multilateral solutions. NATO's enlargement shows us that
the result of Russian policies is Moscow's steady loss of
influence in Europe. Moscow's current capabilities cannot
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be used to shape a Central and Eastern European security
system. They remain essentially negative factors that can
only disrupt, obstruct, or sabotage such frameworks. Thus,
Polish officials believe, on the basis of their conversations in
Moscow, that Russia intends to interpret the Founding Act
unilaterally and selectively, i.e., contrary to the spirit of the
entire enterprise. 85 The absence of viable Russian ideas for
European security underscores this failure to offer Europe a
constructive policy. Foreign states can only view Russia's
policies negatively.
Russia, as presently constituted and governed, cannot
conduct a measured European policy proportionate to the
real opportunities and threats in Europe and the Baltic.
Similarly, Russia's reckless nuclear and military threats,
premeditated violation of treaties that it signed, e.g., the
OSCE code of conduct in 1994 and the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and its reversion to old thinking, offer Europe
little hope. Russia today cannot exercise enough “selfdeterrence” or self-control to reassure its neighbors
concerning its intentions and aims. Therefore, to stabilize
the Baltic, the West, including the littoral states, must
constantly provide the deterrence and reassurance that
Russia has rashly spurned. For this region to achieve true
security, the West, broadly conceived, must take up Russia's
former system-shaping role in the Baltic.
Thus Russia's constant stream of threats, which cannot
materialize, breeds precisely the results it most fears.
Moscow, still without realizing it, has obliged Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and most of all the
United States, to be fully occupied for a long time with
ensuring (de facto, if not de jure) Baltic stability. All these
states are now jointly and collectively involved in providing
soft security to the Baltic. These programs, if not equal to
military guarantees, represent a great change from 1990
and a major loss for Russia. Russia's bluster has precluded
the Baltic's neutralization. The Baltic states are now and
will be an object of the West's lasting and detailed interest,
Moscow's worst fear. By creating constant tension, Moscow
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has foreclosed Baltic neutrality or Finlandization and
undermined its own best interests.
Yet, on the other hand, Western interests are not the
same thing as a Western consensus. The absence of a
Western consensus on regional issues could create a
security vacuum where many states seek a free ride on the
U.S.' back, or the United States tries to pass the buck to its
European allies. We could then end up with a chain of buckpassing and free riding on other states where ultimately no
state takes responsibility for protecting and stabilizing the
area.86 Then the Baltic states' worst fears, their involuntary
placement within a Russian sphere of influence and
vulnerability to Russia, might then take place.
Germany.
Germany's rising power, geography, and historical
connection to the Baltic give it a large and growing role in
shaping the region's future. 87 Therefore German power
must be firmly anchored in European security institutions
which constrain, channel, but also legitimize German
policies. Only U.S. power, manifested in NATO, makes
German power acceptable to Europe in security issues, just
as the EU's international integration makes German
economic power acceptable across Europe.
This relationship must continue, for if NATO does not
expand, its, the U.S.' and the EU's power cannot then be
deployed across Eastern Europe, excluding the area from
any security arrangement. Germany then might have to
repeat its history of bilateral arrangements with Russia
despite other European states' preferences. Were this kind
of relationship to ensue, Russia, due to its size and power,
might come, in time, to be the dominant Central and
Eastern European military power in return for German
economic hegemony. The rest of Europe and the United
States might then unite against German hegemony as
before. To avert these antagonisms, known to historians as
the “nightmare of coalitions,” Bonn officially supports
NATO and EU expansion so that its economic power will be
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fully accepted. An undefined situation in the East is
anathema to Bonn which has repeatedly said that it will not
be NATO's eastern frontier. 88 Either NATO gives it security,
or it has to make a deal with Moscow for security.
NATO's and EU's enlargement determine whether
unification augments rather than lessens and complicates
Germany's security. This explains Ruhe's and Kinkel's
statements on the importance of the Baltic states and
region. This logic also explains Germany's support for EU
negotiations and agreements with the Baltic and other
Central European states towards their eventual
incorporation into the EU. Their EU membership would
stabilize those states and create a tremendous outlet for
German exports and investments. Ultimately, the EU's
expansion will also give Germany an ever greater voice in
the EU's future activities. 89
However, an equally compelling logic or danger, namely
a revisionist and dissatisfied Russia, endangers this
approach. Just as Germany wants guarantees against all
security problems from the East, Bonn also believes that
Russia is the key to East European and European security.
Nothing can or should be undertaken to unsettle Yeltsin's
government. Without admitting it, Germany concedes to
Russia a veto power on NATO's further enlargement and is
probably greatly relieved that Russia does not oppose Baltic
incorporation into the EU. German policy here continues
the Ostpolitik tradition that gave Moscow a veto on the
extent and pace of Central and Eastern Europe's internal
and external transformation and led Bonn into some very
unsavory policies vis-à-vis East Germany and Communist
Poland. 90
Consequently, whereas Germany formerly embraced a
“parallel strategy” to bring Central Europe into NATO and
the EU at roughly the same time, the discovery of the
region's diversity, of its high economic costs and burdens, of
Russia's stout opposition to NATO enlargement and
possibly EU's enlargement, divided and then paralyzed
German policy. This paralysis has led Bonn to abdicate its
leadership role and slow the process of European
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integration. Not surprisingly, other EU members like
France and Italy also developed second thoughts even about
EU expansion or Baltic compliance with European norms on
minority policy. Instead, it was U.S. pressure to enlarge
NATO and the EU that kept the momentum for enlargement going. 91 Much of German hesitation sprang from
Russian pressure, but it also was due to the fact that Prime
Minister Helmut Kohl and Kinkel worry much more about
Russian reactions than does Ruhe, and they control the
policy.
Thus the Baltic states cannot take German advocacy for
granted, even in the EU. And it is clear to most, if not all,
observers that even if NATO does expand eastward by 1999,
EU will not follow suit at least until 2002 or 2003. 92 The
EU's capacity and will to expand remain dependent on
NATO's pressure for its expansion, as was seen in its mid1997 decision to begin accession talks with five new states:
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and
Slovenia. Without NATO's decision to take in three new
members and U.S. pressure to expand the EU and not leave
the Baltics wholly in the cold, that decision would not have
happened. If the EU and/or NATO should nevertheless
falter in their current enlargement plans, Central and
Eastern European economic and security agendas could
then become renationalized. That would mean a (probably
tacit) Russo-German bargain over the area that
substantially transforms the regional security picture.
Indeed, this bargain will probably occur through
NATO's charter, with Russia giving Moscow substantial
opportunities for influencing or obstructing NATO in
Central and Eastern Europe, or a bilateral Russo-German
agreement if that alternative fails. Any future RussoGerman understandings would not be a MolotovRibbentrop agreement for war and for new territorial
aggrandizement along agreed spheres of influence, but
would more likely resemble the Russo-Prussian compacts of
the 18th and 19th centuries. Those accords marked out
mutual spheres of interest where territories were not
necessarily occupied but came under either state's tutelage.
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Indeed, the Founding Act, under German prodding,
proposes the following scheme to Russia: a new CFE treaty
with much lower ceilings in treaty-limited equipment
(TLE), no conventional or nuclear forces on NATO's new
members' territory, formalized consultation in the NATORussian Joint Council on questions of European security, a
pledge to consult the Council should any of its members
detect a threat to security, restraints on foreign and U.S.
troops being stationed in Central Europe, and a promise
that NATO would not use force out of area in peace
operations without U.N. or OSCE approval, where Moscow
has a veto, and cooperation towards joint operations on a
case by case basis under the authority of the Security
Council or the OSCE and where Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF) are used, early joint participation in them.
There also were reports of a tacit “moratorium” on the next
round of enlargement until at least 2005. 93
Most of these concessions to Russia's point of view were
first suggested by Russia in 1995, only to be taken up by
Germany and then contained in the Founding Act. 94 Clearly
this agreement casts a large shadow over Central and East
European security. On the one hand NATO is enlarging to
the East and supposedly getting new missions which make
it a kind of international peacekeeper or peacemaker. On
the other hand, European states not in NATO have to look
elsewhere for self-defense. French sources wonder if the
Joint Council is to take precedence over the North American
Council or serve as an “appeals court” for decisions rendered
in the NAC. As Former Secretary of State Warren
Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William Perry
have recently written,
The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's
reality: the danger to the security of its members is not
primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but
threats to their collective interests beyond their territory... . The
security concerns of most countries of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union will be addressed outside the context of
NATO membership.95
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Given this expansion of the missions to be ascribed to
NATO, it is hardly surprising that critics of the Founding
Act also charge that it signals NATO's fundamental
transformation from an alliance for the collective defense of
its members to a collective or cooperative security system. 96
As international relations theory well recognizes, this is the
easiest security system in the world to break. 97 This hardly
seems the way to advance small European states' security
or moderate and deter Russian adventurism. Yet this
outcome clearly coincides with both German and U.S.
preferences as stated below. And, if this system does break
down and no longer legitimizes German power throughout
Europe, open spheres of influence and bloc politics become
the only possible alternatives.
If anything, NATO and EU expansion represent the
least contentious, if not wholly satisfactory, formula for
Europe. The other alternative would be no security system
east of Germany. Obviously we cannot wholly surmount
Europe's Cold War division into rival and greatly differentiated military-political-economic-cultural blocs in a
single step.98 But any new division outside of the EU and
NATO only creates security vacuums, spheres of influence,
blocs, and a weaker U.S. ability or will to lead in Europe.
For the Baltic states, then, Germany's policy failure
came as something of a betrayal though they cannot and will
not say so openly. In 1992, partly because Russian troops
were still in Germany, Germany and its laender (federal
governments) were eager to participate in Baltic multilateral ventures aiming at economic and political security.
These ventures also involved and showed good faith to
Moscow. Officials stated that integration projects inhibited
potential regional nationalist outbreaks and eased fears
about German nationalism. They understood that
integrating German power in a larger project was the only
way to make it palatable. 99 But by early 1994, Ruhe talked
about involving Nordic states in European security, thereby
reducing Bonn's burden. While he stressed that the West
must help Russia make correct decisions, Russia had to
make them. 100
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Kinkel, already in 1993, saw the Baltic as a hinge to
Russia that could draw it into cooperation and integration.
Regional economic success would mitigate Moscow's
hegemonic tendencies. Although policymakers understood
and sympathized with the Baltic states' plight, they rejected
ideas of “barricading” the region against Russia. Baltic
economic success, helped by Germany, would attract a
reviving Russia into cooperative relationships, easing
Bonn's burden of helping to structure regional relationships. Bonn expected only peaceful scenarios. Once Finland
and Sweden joined the EU, it would focus on free trade
agreements with the Baltic states and common security
programs. Since Russia did not then oppose Baltic
membership in the EU, that would help cement peaceful
ties between them and Russia and be the main instrument
for European security. Bonn also advocated melding
Russian and NATO peace operations and forces that did not
infringe on NATO's Article 5 and linked Europe, Russia,
and the United States. 101
As Claus Genrich reported,
According to German ideas, Russia should be able to discern
from a promising development of the Baltic states, that
cooperation is apt to be more effective than hegemony and
delimitation. Bonn has full understanding for the Balts'
security concerns. However, Germany is seeking to awaken
Baltic consciousness of the fact that they cannot obtain security
“against” Russia. German Baltic policy might describe how the
mode of thought emphasizing influence and power categories
could be replaced by cooperation and reciprocal links. Russians
would then realize that a prosperous Baltic region might well
act as the propelling force for the development of their own
country. . . .
Bonn's diplomacy aims in talks with Russian partners to
preclude any suspicion that, by promoting Baltic interests,
Germany intends to isolate Russia. The Bonn people say that it
is one of the duties of an advocate to counsel his client. It is
therefore appropriate to persuade the Balts to discard the idea
that they need to throw up fortifications against their
neighbors. Initiatives toward the stabilization of relations
between the Baltic countries and Russia represent the only
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promising method for outsiders to give a market economic
impetus to Russian border regions. The gradual equalization
of living standards on both sides of the border is the
indispensable prerequisite for a permanently useful
relationship.102

While Russia has not yet learned this lesson, the Balts'
consciousness has been raised, or their arms twisted. Yet
this logic and the premise that Russia is the most important
state to European security has driven German policy and
paralyzed Germany's overall European policy. Any view
assuming that Russia must be placated before Europe can
be secure inevitably gives Moscow a veto over European
stabilization and encourages its obstructionist tactics. 103
That policy delays Central and Eastern Europe's stabilization, too easily tempts Russian elites to keep playing at
empire, and hinders European integration.
German relations to the Baltic demonstrate this process.
By 1994 Kinkel urged Russian troops to leave the Baltic
(which they did that summer), and both Russia and the
Baltic states to make mutual overtures concerning the
Russian minorities. He also advocated future full
membership for the Baltic states in the EU and an overall
security strategy based on cooperation where the Baltic
states and region were mediators and role models between
East and West, but not NATO members. 104 He rejected all
talk of special Russian relationships in the CIS, but has yet
to outline an active strategy against it. 105 Baltic elites soon
grasped his policy. Whereas many Estonians, in 1991,
viewed Germany as a country that could neutralize Russian
pressure against Estonia, by 1994 nobody believed that
Germany would risk its partnership with Russia for
Estonia's sake. 106
By 1995 Ruhe advised Latvia not to seek security only
along the Poland-Germany axis, but also to seek integration
with Europe by cooperating with the Nordic countries. 107
Although he insisted that Russia must also compromise
with the West, he indicated that Germany had, more than
any other country, sought to integrate Russia and had made
concessions (implicitly unilateral ones) to its viewpoint. He
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told the Baltics there must be no gray areas in Europe.
Germany sought security arrangements that included them
and Russia. Meanwhile the Baltic states should keep
pursuing EU membership. In other words, they should not
rely so much on NATO, but on EU and Scandinavia, policies
that Germany supported. 108
Indeed, in mid-1995 the Baltic states signed the
European agreements with the EU, ostensibly putting them
on the road to the EU. Kinkel echoed Ruhe's remarks and
publicly stated that the changes needed to qualify for the
EU will modernize and strengthen the Baltic states and
make their reforms irreversible. Moreover, the Baltic
security architecture will not be at their expense nor should
the region be a gray area in Europe. Regional security
demands cooperative structures. 109 While Germany also
took part in Baltic PfP and naval exercises and helped train
the Baltic Battalion (Baltbat) and Latvian officers; Kinkel
apparently told Lithuania and Latvia in August 1995 that
Baltic entry into NATO was not on the agenda and could
only be considered after Poland entered.
By 1996, German policy bent further toward Moscow.
Kohl openly opposed anything that might annoy Russia. He
attacked Washington for raising the issue in an election
year (as if democratic debate should be banned). This would
then reverberate in Moscow, presumably to Yeltsin's
detriment. He emphasized EU's (i.e., Germany's) trade with
Russia as a factor leading to its integration and implicitly as
a factor working against the Baltics. 110 At the annual
Wehrkunde conference, Kohl repeated the need to cooperate
with Russia, urging a special NATO-Russia accord “that
could become the core of Europe's security architecture.” 111
By May 1996, Kinkel's public opposition to Baltic entry into
NATO due to the Russian factor became clear, but he also
now believed these states would not enter into the EU
anytime soon, because each leading member had its own
special protege. When Germany would mention Poland,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic, France would cite
Romania.112 Kinkel's argument here overlooked the equally
strong domestic opposition among EU member states to any
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expansion that would reduce the subsidies that key sectors
of their industries get from the EU, or force other
unwelcome reforms upon them. These obstacles have held
EU enlargement hostage to domestic lobbies.
German policy further crystallized during 1996. Estonia
reported that Germany seemed hobbled by domestic and
foreign policy factors, i.e., Russia, but that Kohl was well
disposed towards the Baltic states' security agenda. Still,
their situation was not threatening enough to create
German support for their entry into NATO, especially given
the Foreign Ministry's coolness towards the idea. Ruhe had
to tell them that they would not get in before 2000. And since
NATO expansion will not occur before 1999, this now means
that they will not get into NATO or probably the EU until
2002 or 2003.113
Nor is NATO likely to take them if threats do
materialize. An alliance afraid to take new members lest
they be threatened will not defend them when the threat
appears. Thus the Baltic states are now resigned to German
opposition to their rapid entry into NATO. But they are
visibly impatient and even angry because they feel that
without Germany they lack a strong partner. As Sweden
and Finland are in no hurry to join NATO, the Baltic states
lack friends at court to press their cause while Russian
hostility remains high and constant. 114
Although in 1996 Kinkel claimed to see all three states
as a single strategic unit, he still opposed their entry into
NATO. NATO enlargement should not create division lines
or gray zones. But he did support their future entry into the
EU. 115 Ruhe now cited the Baltic states' importance, but
emphasized the need for a charter with Russia, soft security
such as inter-military cooperation of a bilateral,
multilateral, or PFP nature, and the Baltic Council where
all the littoral states participate. He urged a cooperative
European system including Russia, but also stressed
balancing that with strong Transatlantic cooperation. He
emphasized that the Baltic PfP should be given a stronger
regional focus where Sweden and Finland would lead in
coordinating a kind of Baltic bloc or security community. 116
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But Sweden and Finland reject this solution, precisely
because they and the Baltic states then confront Russia
directly while Germany remains aloof and enjoys a free ride.
If Finland and Sweden led in forming a Baltic or Nordic
bloc that could be seen as a counter to Russia, that would
violate the cardinal point of both states' policy: never to
confront Russia directly alone and if either or both state/s
must do so, they must have ironclad guarantees from real
allies. In such a Baltic bloc, Bonn gains because others
confront Russia on its behalf and provide a semblance of
regional security, while it bears no major responsibility for
guaranteeing Finland and Sweden against Russian
retaliation. As Karl Lammers, Foreign Policy Spokesmen of
the ruling Christian Democratic Union faction in the
Bundestag, recently said,
The question is what role the Baltic states can play both for
Russia and the EU. They can be a bridge to Europe for Russia.
This would have to be made clear through trilateral cooperation.
As long as NATO does not guarantee the Baltic states' security
directly, it could be the task of the EU and the two nonaligned
countries, Sweden and Finland, to have a security policy
influence on that region. Integrated European military
structures could be developed, modeled on the Eurocorps, in
which the Baltic states could participate in a suitable way.117

Germany clearly wants to push the burden of dealing with
Russia in the Baltic onto Sweden and Finland for whom not
confronting Russia directly is a basic precept of policy. That
Germany supports such an alternative only reflects the
extent of German buckpassing and free riding while it tries
to expand its security at the expense of its Baltic and Nordic
partners.
From the foregoing, it is clear that all the concessions
made by NATO to Russia since 1994 display Germany's
desire to have its cake and eat it too. By late 1996, German
officials were competing among themselves to devise
concessions they could give Russia. Kinkel lobbied for
putting Russia in a stronger position vis-à-vis NATO in
talks on security policy cooperation. His ministry asserted
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that Russia would accept NATO expansion because
Moscow's protests were mainly for domestic consumption.
To show Russia that NATO expansion would not produce
gray zones or new divisions, he offered Russian
participation in a joint NATO-Russia consultative “security
committee” of 17, or S-17. 118 NATO and Russia would
conduct “institutionalized consultations on issues of
disarmament and non-proliferation of arms of mass
destruction, peacekeeping measures, and all issues of
mutual interest.” It should be noted that this foretold the
language of the Founding Act which creates the NATORussian Council and a whole structure of bilateral contacts
throughout the NATO organization with free rein to discuss
all issues of mutual interest. 119 In tune with his beliefs
stated above, he argued that these concessions are needed
for Russian domestic politics. More committees on this S-17
pattern would be formed at all levels of NATO's military
hierarchy, placing Russia throughout NATO, where it could
effectively influence NATO decisionmaking or threaten to
use its veto in the Joint Council.
Bonn also supports “joint crisis-management in the
Euro-Atlantic security space,” i.e., Russian involvement in
the Combined Joint Task Force arrangement, presumably
replicating SFOR in Bosnia where Russia accepted NATO's
command. (But Moscow would be loath to do so elsewhere in
Europe). 120 This would mean Russian liaison staffs at the
WEU, as well as at Brussels and SACLANT's Norfolk, VA,
headquarters, which is to be the center for future crisis
operations.121 And it is the basis for the NATO-Russian
mechanism that was agreed to at the Helsinki summit and
the Founding Act. Thanks to this agreement, Russia gains a
formalized voice and right of participation in many, if not all
of NATO's deliberations. Russian spokesmen from Yeltsin
down insisted that the Helsinki summit and the Founding
Act gave them a veto over NATO's activities outside of its
current remit, i.e., anything east of Germany and especially
the CIS, without which the whole enterprise is meaningless.
Since NATO denies this understanding that Moscow
continues to reiterate, the sources of future tension are
already apparent. 122
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Finally, Ruhe proposed that no NATO troops be
stationed on the territory of new NATO members and that
other concessions should also be made as Russia has
demanded. 123 This suggestion paralleled that of Karl
Lammers, a high ranking member of the ruling Christian
Democratic party's Parliamentary faction, that only
European troops be stationed in a NATO Polish force, whose
size would be determined by agreements on arms
limitations. Since Lammers believed the threat to Russia is
U.S. forces, he implied that NATO (i.e., Germany) and
Russia would jointly decide the practical extent of regional
security. “It is necessary to seek an expansion that would be
acceptable to Russia.” 124 It would be interesting to see what
would happen in a real crisis, since few if any member states
want to spend money for modernizing NATO's forces. 125
By January 1997, German sources hinted at a deal
formally to exclude the Baltic states from membership for 510 years in return for Russian acceptance of NATO
expansion. Kinkel again hinted at possible EU membership
for Estonia alone (the strongest Baltic economy), even
though this undermines his previous concept of those states'
strategic unity and fosters a further erosion of regional
solidarity. 126 And since the Founding Act, matters have
become still clearer.
In June 1997, Junior Foreign Minister Helmut Schaefer,
speaking in Moscow, publicly called for a halt to NATO
expansion after the first round lest “a hurt and wounded
Russia” be further antagonized. He observed that Russian
officials' strong opposition to NATO's enlargement had been
“unexpected and frightening.” Therefore, he continued,
“After the first round, we should think about a security
system for the whole of Europe before more harm is done. . . .
I warn all those in Germany who, out of jingoism, want to
take all sorts of countries into the alliance.” 127
For his part, Kinkel now says that the Baltic states
“objectively find themselves in a certain risk situation.”
Accordingly, Euro-Atlantic security structures should
devise ways of drawing them closer without their acquiring
a special status through bilateral agreements (i.e., special
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agreements with the United States to circumvent their
exclusion from NATO) that might impede their future
admission. While NATO should unequivocally restate (as it
did in Rome in 1991) that “its security is inseparably bound
up with that of all Europe,” and its support for all
democratic European states, including the Baltic states,
they still should not come closer to NATO membership. 128
Even though German businessmen now warn about the
danger of a Baltic “gray zone,” and there are those who
support guarantees for the Baltic states, this is not to
happen anytime soon.129 Consequently, he offered a 12point program even in 1996 along the lines stated here
which fits with the recognition of Russian interests as
embodied in the Founding Act and the transformation of
NATO into a collective security system which nonetheless
retains its autonomy. Indeed, Kinkel continues to maintain
that Germany regards itself as the advocate of bringing the
reformed new states closer to Transatlantic and European
institutions.130
Reportedly the Baltic states, who had little choice
anyway, were happy to see Germany's and NATO's concern
for their welfare, but were clearly interested in getting
NATO to commit itself as much as possible to a second round
where they might enter NATO. While this is the implied
U.S. position, it cannot be said for sure if this is Germany's
position, given Schaefer's outburst and Kinkel's ambiguity
and ambivalence. 131 And because the NATO-Russian
Council will surely have to confront this issue, we can expect
more contentiousness over the Baltic and a disunited NATO
as well.
But logical consistency does not seem to matter in a
German policy composed equally of fear, appeasement of
Russia, drift, and ambivalence about European security.
Indeed, observers in Bonn report the government's
uneasiness over the prospect of a public debate over its
policy and NATO's enlargement, something that Germany
desperately needs. 132
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German Policy, the EU and NATO:
The Challenge for the United States.
Clearly Germany, Europe's strongest state and potential
advocate for the Baltic states, has defaulted on them.
Although it seeks an expanded PfP for the Baltic to blur the
distinction between membership and nonmembership in
NATO, the all-important guarantee, signifying that Europe
will resist threats to these states' independence, integrity,
or sovereignty, is lacking. And Bonn will choose Moscow
over the Baltic states. German policy evidently cannot
transcend geography, its ingrained habit of looking to
Moscow as well as to Paris and Washington, and the notion
that Eastern Europe is a liability or source of danger, not an
opportunity. Its policies also seem to be based on
fundamental misconceptions.
Russia's opposition to NATO is not purely for domestic
consumption. As Primakov has said, Russia opposes NATO
enlargement in principle, irrespective of whatever
arguments are made for it. 133 NATO's enlargement unites
Russia's elites in a competition where each faction seeks to
outdo each other in its opposition to NATO, while the public
basically remains apathetic. Nor can economic cooperation,
concessions, and soft security alter Moscow's policy toward
the Baltic. Quite the contrary, Moscow only interprets these
as a green light for further pressure regionally and in
Europe as a whole. Indeed, Moscow has steadily and
successfully raised the ante once it grasped NATO's inner
hesitations and divisions.
Nor does Russian policy rely so much on economic
blandishments. Germany seems to have overlooked
Russia's policy as described above and the fact that under
Western pressure Baltic policy has shifted, if grudgingly,
while Moscow's stance has become tougher as it senses
Western irresolution and confusion, exactly the opposite of
what it predicted. Giving Russia a veto over NATO's future
enlargement or activities inside the CIS or the Baltic, or the
Balkans does not end Moscow's revisionism and
unilateralism.
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Russia's insistence on a free hand in integrating the CIS
creates a line of demarcation, as in the Caucasus. Here
Moscow does what it accuses NATO of doing as it returns to
Turkey's border.
Furthermore, while it many not be fashionable to admit
this, Russia, not NATO, started drawing the lines by its own
neo-imperial actions in the CIS and increasingly
antidemocratic policies, both beginning in 1993. Russia's
threats to Ukrainian and Baltic sovereignty, demands
concerning borders and the Russian diaspora, imperial
policies in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, its support for
coups in Azerbaijan, its coercive use of military force to
compromise the integrity of Georgia and its sovereignty,
and to force Armenia and Georgia to give it permanent
bases did in advance what it claims NATO would do by
moving East. Russia did all this on the boundary of a NATO
member, Turkey.134
Germany cannot create cooperative security regimes
without gray zones and lines of division while Russia
successfully insists on such lines for itself, a neo-colonialist
hegemony over the CIS, and a Europe where some states
enjoy security guarantees but others do not. In effect,
Germany urges others take the lead in the Baltic and take
risks that it will not assume for itself even within NATO and
the EU. It refrains from taking an active position even
inside these organizations where its power is strong, but
bounded, apparently seeking the benefits of buckpassing,
free riding, and consorting with everyone. Its policy
represents a vain effort to reconcile Russia's veto on NATO,
a strong transatlantic connection, and equal security for all
or even part of Central and Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, the reliance on the EU is utterly
unfounded. If NATO will not act, neither will the EU.
Brussels resents NATO and Washington's pressure that it
fulfill its supposed historic responsibility of integrating
Eastern Europe, while NATO shirks this task but claims it
is acting under U.S. leadership to move into Central
Europe. The EU will not be rushed by some U.S. timetable,
official or not. Neither will it easily amend its own
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procedures of minute observations of candidates' every
attribute before acting. The EU will make “objective”
judgments," not “political” ones. Nor will the EU be rushed
into making a decision that might jeopardize it, or the Baltic
states, even if Estonia is now a candidate for future EU
membership. 135
A deeper examination of the EU's record and its futile
quest for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) shows
Germany's faulty judgment. Jacques Delors, the EU's
former Secretary-General and architect of the Maastricht
Treaty, wrote in his memoirs that he never believed Europe
could obtain the CFSP. 136 The EU's leading members lack
the will, the resources, the commitment, or the unity of
approach to craft and enforce a coherent Central European
policy. As Hans van den Broek, the EU Commissioner for
external relations with Central and Eastern Europe,
recently said, “Shaping the future of Europe is more
important than preparing the accession of new members to
the EU.”137
It is quixotic to rely on the EU to bail out NATO and
make it bear the burden of the Baltic. That just means that
NATO passes the buck to the EU in search of a free ride. And
even if the EU does admit those states, that would not
happen for at least 5-6 years. Anyone familiar with the EU's
inability to agree on foreign and defense policy cannot be
optimistic. Just as France, Germany, and Great Britain
seem incapable of agreement on foreign and defense
policies, Bonn cannot make the political decisions it should
be making. While Bonn's acceptance of Russia's droit de
regard (right of supervision) of Eastern and Central Europe
is appeasement, it is appeasement to secure selfish but
hidden German interests suppose dly in Europe's name. It
also is appeasement in the hope of a future hegemony
through European security agencies and an accord with
Russia over Central Europe. 138 Apparently Germany, as
Schaefer suggested above, will also reject any future Baltic
membership in NATO to appease Russia. 139 Fraser
Cameron of the European Commission concluded that,
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Sitting on the fence may at times be uncomfortable, but it is
the preferred German position. Thus Germany is in favor of
widening and deepening the EU; of enlarging to the east and to
the south; of enlarging NATO and seeking a strategic
partnership with Russia; of strengthening WEU and
NATO–but not increasing its defense budget.140

Conclusions for NATO and the United States.
Clearly, if the United States does not lead in the
formation of a Baltic (and European) security system,
nobody else will. Instead, other states will make deals
without us, against our interests, and Europe's overall
security. Although Poland, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden
have made important contributions towards soft security in
the Baltic, they cannot assume the unilateral or even joint
burden of directly confronting Russia in the Baltic without
NATO's firm support. This, too, may be buckpassing, but at
least it derives from history and real power realities. These
states need great power commitments to transcend their
present levels of activity. In the Baltic, Washington must
balance against Moscow's imperial tendencies and Bonn's
inclination to appease them.
Indeed, Washington has already undertaken numerous
regional initiatives dating back to helping Russia withdraw
its troops from the Baltic in 1994. It has led the way to an
integrated regional air traffic control system, the basis for
extending NATO's air defense system eastward. This
system goes beyond proposals for subregional security
guarantees or associations, where the Nordic countries take
the lead. And there also are specific agreements with major
West European states in areas like air defense, specifically
identification of friend or foe (IFF). 141
U.S. policy already transcends purely regional or
subregional solutions to regional issues and is deeply
involved with Baltic security programs. For instance,
President Clinton's discussions with Swedish Prime
Minister Goeran Persson, in August 1996, revealed much
about both states' policies and led Clinton to support
Sweden's five-point Baltic policy. 142 Even earlier, Swedish
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Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen reiterated Swedish
support for Baltic membership in the EU because only thus
will their voices be heard. While Sweden cannot guarantee
their security in NATO, it supports their right to
membership if enlargement does not occur at the expense of
those states who are not admitted or do not wish to be
admitted to NATO. These states, like Sweden, must gain
chances for more cooperation with NATO. 143 Sweden also
believes that Baltic membership in the EU will promote
regional cooperation with Russia, and help the Baltic states
conduct generous minority policies. 144 This line of reasoning
differs from Bonn's past policy which does not seem to tie
Baltic membership in the EU to better treatment of Russian
minorities, but apparently rather reverses that order.
Swedish officials hinted they might use their veto power in
the EU to this end because they fear a nightmare scenario
where everyone else takes a free ride and Finland and
Sweden must face the burdens and risks. In this scenario
NATO expands in Central Europe, Russian pressure
against the Baltics grows, the United States cuts back its
European role, and EU enlargement only encompasses
Central Europe and ties up that organization. 145 The risks
in Baltic admission to the EU are that the EU then must
give some sort of guarantee, if only a “soft security” one, to
the Baltic states. Everything shows that it is unwilling to
admit them or give them a real commitment. The Baltic
states, Sweden, and Finland would be left in the lurch. 146
Therefore, Persson's five-point plan envisioned a
broader regional program. Sweden will:

•

Increase existing bilateral cooperation in economics,
and in environmental and energy policy with the
Baltic states.

•

Expand regional cooperation within the framework of
the Baltic Sea Council.

•

Support EU enlargement to include the Baltic states.
President Clinton announced his support for this as
well.
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•

Expand the PfP role in the Baltic and convey Baltic
states' desire to join NATO. Since Washington ruled
this desire out, it was happy to support their
membership in EU and to pressure the EU
accordingly.

•

Stress direct dialogue with Russia. 147

President Clinton supported this program and was pleased
that Sweden was adopting a regional “leadership role.” 148
Washington also supported establishing a regional PfP
headquarters in Sweden for peacekeeping operations.
However, these discussions also revealed disturbing
facts about the U.S. position on the more general European
security issues. Swedish journalists also learned that
Washington wants the PfP program to resemble NATO as
much as possible and NATO to appear increasingly as a
collective security organization. 149 In that case, these
officials argued, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, calling
for collective self-defense, will be seen as a last resort. Since
PfP and NATO both call for consultations under Article 4, if
consultation works, “we will never have to use Article 5.” 150
The effort to renounce or depreciate Article 5 was “shouted
from a megaphone.” Sweden heard U.S. concerns that the
EU does not want to expand and has little security
relevance, while the IFOR in Bosnia was already a regional
peacekeeping force. 151 One Swedish diplomat said that a
senior U.S. official told him that NATO was a force for
cooperation for collective security rather than collective
defense. Article 5 was an asset “more for the credibility for
the political superstructure than something that it actually
could be necessary to use.” 152
In the U.S. view, PfP forces will ultimately resemble
NATO's forces and gain assignments to do peace operations,
humanitarian intervention, and conflict management
within the framework of the WEU's 1992 Petersberg
Agreement. Sweden could participate in those operations
and cooperate with NATO while retaining its current
defense profile.153 Washington also supports building up an
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ESDI only within NATO. 154 Sweden and Finland could then
be models of civilian control and decisionmaking for future
members' armed forces and cooperate with NATO through
the PfP. Their nonalignment calms Russia and shows the
Baltics that NATO is not the only road to security.
Washington aspires to reciprocal membership for all
members of the EU and NATO where an ESDI is in NATO,
not a moribund WEU. 155
These statements of U.S. policy fully conform to U.S.
efforts to depict NATO enlargement as a major step in the
transformation of NATO and, more broadly, of European
security into a cooperative or collective security
arrangement rather than a purely mutual security alliance
for collective defense as it has been until now. Certainly
they comport with the statement by Christopher and Perry
above. NATO's enlargement is also the cornerstone of
European democratization, and the enlargement of market
democratic states is a fundamental element of a national
security program of democratic enlargement. 156 While the
new members may crave the guarantee of Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, Washington evidently believes that in
the new Europe, Article 5 will not be needed because
collective security will reign within NATO and cooperative
security throughout Europe. As Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright has stated, enlargement makes it more
likely that American forces will not have to be used in
Europe. This was the point made by Henry Kissinger in his
critique of the Founding Act and the Helsinki summit, but
what he failed to grasp is that this appears to be the
conscious intention the allies, specifically Germany and the
United States. 157 Kinkel openly speaks of the NATO area
and Europe as one of collective security, and the United
States, from President Clinton on down, sells NATO
enlargement, not as a military-defensive alliance but as a
project for the enlargement of democracy and integration,
and almost a trade policy. 158
For example, a State Department paper presented in
April 1997 to the III Annual Convention of the Association
for the Study of Nationalities, an academic organization
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devoted to studying ethnic issues in Central and Eastern
Europe, stated,
The countries of our region [Central Europe] can become
modernized only through integration; thus our NATO agenda
is based essentially not on geopolitical considerations but on
the desire to get integrated. . . By enlarging NATO, we want to
prevent wars, not to win them. 159

Secretary of State Albright duly invokes a productive
paradox that allegedly operates here. NATO is an
instrument of preventive diplomacy in that the further it
advances, the less risk there is that it will be needed. 160
Therefore, NATO members can all demilitarize safely.
Threat scenarios involving NATO members will not arise.
The classical concept of collective security where all parties
are presumed in advance to share a common belief on the
origin, nature of, and appropriate response to crises and
aggression is postulated as a fait accompli. Thus
consultation under Article 4 will suffice when some crisis
happens. The hard cases are finessed away through a
response made up in equal parts of hope, wishful thinking, a
neo-Wilsonian ideology, and the unproven belief that
Russia is a democratic partner of the United States who
accepts a new U.S.-led alliance system in Europe.
Obviously Russian realities do not conform to this belief
system. Russia's revisionism is incompatible with the U.S.
vision of a neo-Wilsonian collective security. What happens
then to the hard security issue, i.e., collective defense? Who
ensures that the Balts or anyone else are not left in a
Russian sphere or limbo? Who helps defend against attack
or subversion? And what happens if they are threatened?
The implicit premise is that in the event of a threat everyone
will consult under Article 4 and/or the Partnership for Peace
protocols and agree on a response. But if they do not agree,
what then? If consultation under Article 4 does not work, or,
more likely, ends up with inter-allied divisions as in Bosnia,
then allied action, whether it occurs under Article 5 or some
other article of NATO's key documents becomes irrelevant.
Allied discord would prevent action under any article,
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Articles 4 or 5, or the PfP accords gaining nothing for the
Baltics or anyone else who feels threatened. Moreover,
authoritative Russian commentators know fully well that
the allies will not wish to provoke a political confrontation,
let alone a major crisis, with Russia over the Baltics. Thus
they believe that Russia will have a de facto veto in the new
Council, even if nobody there wanted to plead Russia's case.
However, Germany and France will not let the United
States act unilaterally too often, and, if they do, the Council
will then break down into a stalemate once Russia vetoes
anything against its interests. Indeed, Russians are already
complaining that its first meeting showed that NATO really
intends to disregard Russia and its interests. 161
Russia's upcoming emplacement in NATO, its determination to use the new agreements in a unilateral manner,
the vacillations of our allies, many of whom are apparently
ready to “plead Russia's case,” and NATO's palpable
unwillingness to confront hard military questions such as
paying for defense modernization, make these all
troublesome issues that we are still not confronting.
Russia's presence in NATO via the Council only enhances
its incentives and opportunities to incite and foment
divisions among members. Moscow will not find it hard to
obstruct a coherent NATO reply to its efforts to expand its
sphere of influence because Western hesitations have
already left peace operations and other security operations
in the CIS to an organization where Moscow has a veto.
Washington has concurrently sought substitute
solutions to the security problem through innovations
applying both to the Baltic and to the larger PfP program.
Thus it created a Baltic Action Plan in August-September
1996. This plan has three key elements: assisting the Baltic
states to join European security institutions, encouraging
improved relations between them and Russia, and
expanding U.S. relations with them to include “cooperation
charters” with each state detailing cooperation in security,
political issues, and economics. 162 It also entails support for
the regional air defense system and the Baltic battalion
made up of soldiers and officers from all three Baltic
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states.163 Washington believes that such cooperation under
the PfP and Article 4 eliminates the need for stronger
guarantees that provoke Russia. Washington also asserts
that this cooperation also deters Russia from threatening
the Baltic states lest NATO's reaction makes it lose the
benefits it would gain from improved Russo-Baltic and
East-West relations. Meanwhile, Washington hopes for
future changes in the situation even though the plan, which
it hopes will be ratified in a forthcoming Baltic charter, does
not provide security guarantees. Thus it will not rule out
future Baltic membership in NATO–much to Russia's
dismay.
The Baltic states have reacted with restraint to the
Baltic Action Plan. Estonia is even opposed to a charter with
NATO lest it establish a special NATO-Estonian relationship outside membership that would delay Estonia's entry
into NATO.164 Still, this and other initiatives, like the
regional air defense plan for Central and Eastern Europe,
imperfect as they are, are still material advances toward
integration and preventive security. While nobody will give
guarantees, integration through soft security, which might
ultimately reduce regional tension, is clearly occurring.
U.S. policy also follows along the paths outlined in the
conversations with Sweden. In July 1997 NATO chose its
first members for accession. NATO understands that
Russia will seek to tie up NATO, link enlargement to the
CFE treaty, and seek a veto over enlargement. Thus NATO
decided that Polish, Czech, and Hungarian security, not to
mention Baltic security, will not be contingent on Russian
security arrangements that are inimical to their interests
and to security in Central Europe. The conclusion of the
Founding Act casts doubt on its decision not to tie new
membership to any separate deal with Russia. But now,
only time and NATO's resolve will tell.
At the OSCE and NATO December 1996 meetings in
Lisbon and Brussels, Washington offered specific Baltic
initiatives. While the original PfP program listed 22 areas of
cooperation–peace and humanitarian operations, democratization of civil-military relations, crisis management,
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interoperability, and logistics–as proposed by then
Secretary of Defense Perry, the new, expanded PfP involves
partner states in planning and executing actual military
operations, disaster relief, peacemaking, and delivery of
humanitarian aid. 165 The meetings' communiques listed the
specifics of this expanded program to include greater
political and military cooperation among the partners and,
as Washington told Stockholm, drew the partners ever
closer to actual membership in practice. 166
This approach has two fundamental advantages. First,
it solidifies and advances NATO's capability to function as a
true security organization and an instrument for effective
collective action based on the members' consensus. Second,
this program advances beyond NATO's 1991 Copenhagen
meeting, when NATO first expressly stated its direct and
material concern for Central and Eastern European
security. Today, the more NATO interacts with regional
governments, the more they come to depend on it and the
more obliged it should feel towards them. If NATO
continues to believe in its enlargement and that this
“creeping integration” is desirable and inevitable, then this
line of action is the best way to steer the process. NATO then
would not suddenly face demands for membership when a
major threat arises.167 In that case, a NATO that had
declined in peacetime to defend Central Europe and that
had passed the buck would face demands for action in a time
of crisis, or even war. That would probably split NATO and
prevent it from acting under either Article 4 or Article 5.
By controlling the process, the United States and NATO
can devise a program that eliminates many of the new
states' fears and concerns while integrating them as closely
as possible in a “semi-Article 5" relationship on a PanEuropean basis. That phrase denotes a relationship based
on the PfP language which is close to Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty, but adds a political dimension to the
PfP. By adding the members’ input and a political structure
to the PfP, we would realize some of the goals that the
Clinton administration presented to Swedish representatives in 1996. 168
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NATO’s present consensus probably will not permit
further steps, but this is already a considerable amount.
Still, to secure the Baltic region and Europe, Washington
must keep driving the European consensus. If it shirks its
duty, others will follow suit, triggering an epidemic of freeriding and NATO's practical dissolution. This control over
the admission process must be exercised throughout all its
phases lest new and/or old members turn selfish about other
regional states' membership and balk at defending them, at
a time when Russia's policy becomes still more aggressive
and attempts to frighten NATO. The rejected candidates
should not have to think that Russia is their only choice. 169
Instead, the program that came together at the end of 1996
offers the right blend of control, transparency, and U.S.
steering of the operation to prevent Europe's door from
closing prematurely. It preserves partners' equality within
PfP, extends their responsibilities and learning curve while
preparing them for entry, and holds the door open for Russia
should it accept the project. 170 However, it does so at a price.
Namely it substantially alters the nature of the NATO
alliance away from its traditional restriction to a collective
defense pact towards a new relationship in line with ideas of
cooperative and collective security. But it is those very ideas
that seem to exercise the most influence on U.S. policy.
The Need for Continuing U.S. Leadership.
Still, problems remain. It may grate on European, and
especially French, ears to hear this, but it remains true that
an ESDI or CFSP is no closer to fruition today than before,
and notions of the WEU as a European pillar remain
stillborn. Without U.S. support or NATO's acquiescence,
other agencies, like the WEU, let alone Combined Joint
Task Forces (CJTFs), cannot perform major security
tasks.171 Only the United States can devise a durable
multilateral Baltic security regime. If we keep proclaiming
our leadership in Europe, then we must display that
leadership in action.
The OSCE's abilities pertain only to conflict prevention
and mediation where both sides are willing to negotiate.
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Although Russia often proclaims its desire for the OSCE to
lead European security, Moscow defies it with impunity. 172
The OSCE's successes in the Baltic stem from these states'
susceptibility to Western pressure more than the OSCE's
own institutional legitimacy. This inclination to the West
induces the Baltic states to heed its advice on minority
policy, since they know that otherwise they will not obtain
entry to the West or security from Russia. 173
Because the OSCE clearly cannot respond to Baltic
security challenges but the EU and NATO can, it is
senseless to deny the Baltic states both EU and NATO
membership when appeasing Russia only brings increased
demands and truculence. This does not mean necessarily
admitting the Baltic states into NATO. But it does mean
much more clarity and a tough-minded policy that is not
based on wishful thinking regarding Russia.
Thus we are evidently laboring under several misconceptions as we defend and advance NATO's enlargement. First, while we seek Russia as a strategic partner on
nuclear issues, its openly expressed goals and policies are
inimical to European peace and stability and to the role of
partner.174 Russian policy openly demands an exclusive
sphere of influence in the CIS and attempts to prevent
Central and East Europe from achieving true military
security and equality to it in Europe. Such demands are
clearly unacceptable to those states and should be equally
unacceptable to NATO, which cannot renounce its freedom
to act to defend its members. If official Russian statements
on European security were published and explained, they
would create more public support for NATO's enlargement.
Such publication would create greater awareness of
Russia's goals as stated above. Certainly Russian public
statements indicate that Moscow's delegation and officials
believe that the Founding Act and Helsinki summit gave
them a veto over NATO and no reason to change their Baltic
policies. Indeed, Yeltsin offered new unilateral guarantees
of Baltic security, but not of borders or an end to threats
against the Baltic states. Therefore, these “guarantees”
were rejected. 175
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A second misconception flows from the first one about
Russia as a partner. Moscow's policies indicate a continuing
need for a robust interpretation of Articles 4 and 5 which
guarantee, first, consultation, and then if a member is
attacked, collective defense. Thus, despite the concessions
that Russia has won from NATO, it remains unpersuaded of
the benefits of NATO or possibly even the EU's enlargement
or of the virtues of the status quo. Russia will continue to
threaten the CIS, and beyond that, Eastern Europe, if it is
not checked. Moscow seems determined to create
permanent tension in the Baltic or vis-à-vis Poland to
prevent a more stable situation or such membership from
arising.176
There are other misconceptions as well. All the soft
security innovations are useful and beneficial, but Russia
has refused to participate fully in the PfP and deliberately
seeks to obstruct NATO. And although PfP is close to the
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, it does not give PfP
members, like the Baltic states, the right to activate
consultation mechanisms. Instead, it states that under
certain conditions NATO will consult among the PfP
members or purely among alliance members. Nor does the
Baltic states' association agreement with the WEU give
them that right there, either. 177 Yet while we contend that
NATO's main purpose is democratic extension and
enlargement, not the collective defense that makes the
former possible, Russia and most of Central and Eastern
Europe still think in other, older terms, notwithstanding
their rhetoric. While democratization is a truly historic and
enduring benefit of NATO, NATO's purpose remains, first
and foremost, collective defense which provides the basis for
democratic integration. Putting democratic integration
first confuses NATO's benefits with its purpose and, by
obscuring its purpose, makes its possible to weaken NATO's
cohesion while Russian policy continues to justify the need
for collective defense albeit at lower force and spending
levels.
We should not refrain from making NATO's case.
Failure to state the real and sound reasons for NATO's
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enlargement engenders suspicion and cynicism at home.
Then, far too many observers cannot discern a rational
reason for enlarging NATO, creating suspicions that we
have something to hide. As a result, we have inadvertently
undermined the priceless assets of the competence and
resolution of U.S. foreign policy.
Thus we should forsake the idea that Article 5 is
moribund or should be and that NATO is essentially for
purposes of collective security. Much of today's writing on
collective security either misunderstands the concept or
twists it into strange shapes to minimize or conceal its
objectionable features and promote the author's agenda. 178
There is good reason for such academic strategies for they
seek to mask the crippling weaknesses that invalidate the
concept as a viable basis for European security. NATO's
first purpose is collective defense, not the validation of a
concept that was and remains inherently defective in
practice.
Another misconception is that somehow we can farm out
our leadership role to Germany as a mediator and to the EU
as a security provider. Neither of these entities can lead
Europe or be persuaded to do what Washington or NATO
will not do for themselves or their allies. Such efforts only
breed resentment, misunderstanding, security failures, and
help renationalize German security policy. Such efforts also
represent our own attempts at buckpassing and free riding.
And if we engage in those pastimes, who can blame others
for doing so?
There is no fundamental obstacle, save the EU's
timorousness, to implementing a program outlining what
Central and Eastern Europe must do to gain membership
and committing itself and those states to follow it. And if
European governments truly believe their rhetoric about
the EU as a security provider they would rush to implement
it for the entire region, not just the Baltic. The disinclination
to do either of these things means that NATO, specifically
Washington, must push the EU rather hard lest the
divisibility of European security harden. We cannot lead by
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subcontracting foreign and defense policy to a divided and
disunited Europe.
EU membership for the Baltic states seems particularly
useful if Russia intends, as suggested above, to launch a
campaign of economic warfare and internal subversion in
the Baltic states. Baltic efforts to meet the EU's entry
requirements would certainly strengthen them against
such efforts, but if those requirements remain invisible or
are constantly expanded, there will only be endless
equivocation. They will rightly lose heart then as the EU
will have clearly shown it does not want them.
Thus the United States must again lead. Some of the
aforementioned initiatives increase Baltic states' ability to
play in NATO and learn how it works. Russia should be
urged to participate more fully in the PfP program in order
to test its bona fides. While NATO can certainly afford to be
magnanimous and extend partnership with Russia, that
magnanimity cannot come to mean a pretext for a new
division of Europe into rival spheres of influence.
Concluding Proposals for Future U.S. Policy.
Since nobody else can lead in the Baltic or Europe,
failure to lead will erode allied cohesion, increase
buckpassing and free riding, and create worse divisions in
Europe than would NATO expansion. Accordingly,
Washington ought to take the following steps, realizing that
all previous expansions of NATO have created lines, as well
as conditions for further expansions that have superseded
those lines. 179 Because NATO is both an institution for
collective defense and an evolving civic community whose
doors are perennially open to all who qualify, we must
continue to make it clear that those doors will remain open
and decisively rebuff speculation and Russian pressure that
there only be one expansion. 180
This means inviting Russia to join Europe, but the
invitation, as stated above, should not be an open-ended
one. Russia should not be allowed to obtain an unequal
security or status compared to other states. NATO cannot
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grant special rights to Russia in the CIS or Central Europe
or the right, omnipresent in German proposals, to paralyze
NATO. Nor can it give Russia a veto over Central Europe's
defense. Granting Russia such terms and/or a veto drives a
stake through the hopes for European security.
Instead U.S. policy should foster the spread of integrative processes through public pressure on the EU to move
forward and eastward and on prospective NATO members
to meet NATO's standards as set forth in the 1995 NATO
Enlargement Study. 181 U.S. policy appeared to be
contradictory on this point. On the one hand, Ambassador to
NATO Robert Hunter denied that NATO and EU
membership are parallel processes. On the other hand, we
are pressuring the EU to accelerate its membership process
for the Baltic and other East European states. Robert
Simmons, deputy head of the Office of European Security
and Policy at the State Department, told Sweden's
delegation in August 1996 that the new NATO will back the
ESDI that the EU is pushing for and,
The logic of the processes in both the EU and within NATO
indicates that ultimately they will mean reciprocal membership
of both the EU and NATO. It seems logical that an adjusted
NATO, which has a relationship with the EU, should be
attractive to all members of the EU.182

Finally, in May 1997, Under Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott stated that we support EU's deepening in the West
and broadening to the East and view NATO's enlargement
as creating an environment that is conducive to the EU's
enlargement as well. The two processes are parallel and
should both support a deeper transatlantic community. 183
Sadly, it is unlikely that, even with American pressure, the
EU will bail NATO out in the East. While this pressure is
necessary, it must be upgraded, for to hope or pretend that
the EU will bail out NATO is merely another form of
buckpassing on the hard cases. Nor will the EU act unless
America galvanizes it through NATO. Proposals for a
CFSP, ESDI, or to make the WEU the center of European
defense activity are meaningless where European countries
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will not spend the resources or harmonize their foreign and
defense policies. The entire discussion of European security
would gain from candor regarding the WEU's and the EU's
unreadiness for foreign and defense policy coordination as
shown most recently in Albania's crisis. 184
Furthermore, there are many reasons why the postSoviet states must have a tangible economic and defense
prospect of security before them. Moscow's past record of
economic warfare against the Baltic states and Ukraine
should suffice as an example of that need. The real and
apparently quite imminent danger here is that we may
believe that we really have completed our mission and rely
on guaranteed consultations for PfP members and the Joint
Council with Russia alone and not on the alliance's inherent
capabilities. 185 We would then have failed to deter as well as
to reassure all the Baltic players. This would be a fatal error.
Russia's policy in the CIS and the Baltic overtly threatens
their integrity and sovereignty and then the security of the
first tier of Central European states beyond their borders.
This is not a fashionable view or one that people are
hurrying to make public. Nevertheless, the evidence
presented here, official statements of Russian leaders and
much of Russia's elite discussion, reflects that conclusion.
Indeed, Russian diplomats' words and actions regarding
the Baltic constitute a frank espousal of coercive diplomacy.
Yet, since the wherewithal for such strategies is utterly
lacking, the pursuit of such a strategy, ostensibly on behalf
of Russians in the CIS and the Baltic states, could trigger a
major crisis of the Russian state. If Russia crashes while
trying to pursue a policy of “imperial overstretch,” that
would have far-reaching and profoundly dangerous results,
both politically and geographically all across Europe. As
Roman Szporluk of Harvard University wrote, the demand
to pursue a policy based on “saving” the 25 million or so
Russian diaspora sacrifices the interests of the 125 million
Russians in Russia proper to an adventurist policy. 186 And
the essence of that kind of policy is that Moscow cannot
calibrate ends and means or know where to stop.
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Thus we cannot do without Article 5 and should stop
saying that we are approaching a time when it is
superfluous or unnecessary. While it is right to blur the
boundaries between membership and PfP, it is wrong to
give others the impression that NATO can be divided, or
that it will passively stand by in cases of aggression or
threats to security in Europe. That will only invite
aggressive probes, crisis if NATO reacts strongly,
disillusionment when NATO does not respond effectively,
and, inevitably, erosion of alliance cohesion. Any hint that
NATO will not respond to Russian probes will rapidly tempt
Germany to make its own deal with Russia regarding
Central and Eastern Europe.
Moreover, sensitive Russian observers know that a
profound connection exists between the extent of Russia's
stabilization and democratization and the fervor for NATO
expansion. 187 To the extent that the former fails, the latter
grows as has been the case since 1993. A Russia that thinks
and acts along the lines of Kinkel's analysis or of the
Wilsonian impulse in U.S. foreign policy might become a fit
partner for us in Europe. But that is not and will not be
Yeltsin's Russia. Instead Russia's demands are at odds with
both European security and its own domestic tranquility.
They can only be met by NATO's firm but measured riposte,
a riposte that, as the more intelligent Russian analysts
know, will once and for all terminate the erotic lure of
empire in Russia's European policies and help consolidate
true democracy at home. When and if that happens and to
the extent that it does, we can then move onto the next stage
of a project which could well become security from
Vancouver to Vladivostok.
But if we ignore the Baltic and accept the idea that the
divisibility of European security must be implemented in its
most rigid and enduring form, and that the East-West
divide of the last 5 centuries must also be perpetuated for
the long term, neither small states, Russia nor the West will
enjoy much security. Hence statements about Article 5
being superfluous are very unfortunate, for they betray a
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misunderstanding of NATO and of the reality of European
politics today.
Once Russia opted for its hegemonic sphere of influence
in the CIS and for an unaccountable government that is not
bound by democratic laws or anchors, it divided Europe, if
not along Cold War lines, then along new geopolitical lines.
NATO's enlargement, if anything, overcomes many of the
lines of division in Europe, going back to the Renaissance
and also creates the least possible threatening conditions
for overcoming more of those lines in the future. This does
not mean that we must now expand NATO to the Baltic
states. But it does mean that we cannot simply leave them
in the lurch. We now have the power and bear the burden of
devising a regime for that region which retains the
possibility of its full integration into Europe. The EU should
move east, PfP and NATO should both grow, and Russia
should be deterred from further unprofitable and dangerous
adventures. In other words, we still must provide both
reassurance and deterrence. Nobody else can or will. We
may complain about this burden and this opportunity, but
we can no longer shirk them.
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